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Abstract: In this paper, the development of mathematical concepts 
over time is considered. Particular reference is given to the shift-
ing of attention from step-by-step procedures that are performed in 
time, to symbolism that can be manipulated as mental entities on 
paper and in the mind. The development is analysed using different 
theoretical perspectives, including the SOLO model and various 
theories of concept construction to reveal a fundamental cycle un-
derlying the building of concepts that features widely in different 
ways of thinking that occurs throughout mathematical learning.
Introduction
Over recent years, various theories have arisen to explain 
and predict cognitive development in mathematics educa-
tion. The focus in this paper is to raise the debate beyond 
a simple comparison of detail in different theories, and to 
move towards identifying deeper underlying themes that en-
able us to offer insights into issues concerning the learning 
of Mathematics. In particular, a focus of analysis on fun-
damental learning cycles provides an empirical basis from 
which important questions concerning the learning of math-
ematics can and should be addressed.
To assist us with this focus we distinguish two kinds of the-
ory of cognitive growth: 
• global frameworks of long-term growth of the individ-
ual, such as the stage-theory of Piaget (e.g., see the anthol-
ogy of Piaget’s works edited by Gruber & Voneche, 1977), 
van Hiele’s (1986) theory of geometric development, or 
the long-term development of the enactive-iconic-sym-
bolic modes of Bruner (1966).
• local frameworks of conceptual growth such as the ac-
tion-process-object-schema theory of Dubinsky (Czar-
nocha, Dubinsky, Prabhu, & Vidakovic, 1999) or the 
unistructural-multistructural-relational-unistructural se-
quence of levels in the SOLO Model (Structure of the Ob-
served Learning Outcome, Biggs & Collis, 1991; Pegg, 
2003).
Some theories (such as those of Piaget, van Hiele, and the 
full SOLO model) incorporate both global and local frame-
works. Bruner’s enactive-iconic-symbolic theory formulates 
a sequential development that leads to three different ways 
of approaching given topics at later stages. Others, such as 
the embodied theory of Lakoff and Nunez (2000) or the situ-
ated learning of Lave and Wenger (1990) paint in broader 
brush-strokes, featuring the underlying biological or social 
structures involved.
Global theories address the growth of the individual over the 
long-term, often starting with the initial physical interaction 
of the young child with the world through the development 
of new ways of operation and thinking as the individual ma-
tures.  Table 1 tabulates four global theoretical frameworks. 
Table 1. Global stages of cognitive development
Piaget 
Stages
van Hiele 
Levels 
(Hoffer,1981)
SOLO 
Modes
Bruner 
Modes
Sensori Motor
Pre-operational
Concrete Operational
Formal Operational
I Recognition
II Analysis
III Ordering
IV Deduction
 V Rigour
Sensori Motor
Ikonic
Concrete Symbolic
Formal 
Post-formal
Enactive
Iconic
Symbolic
An example of the type of development that such global per-
spectives entail can be seen by the meaning associated with 
the five modes in the SOLO model summarised in Table 2 
(Pegg, p.242, 2003). 
Table 2. Description of Modes in the SOLO Model
Sensori-motor: 
(soon after birth)
A person reacts to the physical environ-
ment. For the very young child it is the 
mode in which motor skills are acquired. 
These play an important part in later life 
as skills associated with various sports 
evolve. 
Ikonic: 
(from 2 years)
A person internalises actions in the form 
of images. It is in this mode that the 
young child develops words and images 
that can stand for objects and events. 
For the adult this mode of functioning 
assists in the appreciation of art and 
music and leads to a form of knowledge 
referred to as intuitive.
Concrete symbolic: 
(from 6 or 7 years)
A person thinks through use of a sym-
bol system such as written language and 
number systems. This is the most com-
mon mode addressed in learning in the 
upper primary and secondary school.
Formal: 
(from 15 or 16 
years)
A person considers more abstract con-
cepts. This can be described as working 
in terms of ‘principles’ and ‘theories’. 
Students are no longer restricted to a 
concrete referent. In its more advanced 
form it involves the development of dis-
ciplines.
Post Formal: 
(possibly at around 
22 years)
A person is able to question or challenge 
the fundamental structure of theories or 
disciplines
Underlying these ‘global’ perspectives is the gradual bio-
logical development of the individual.  The newborn child 
is born with a developing complex sensory system and in-
teracts with the world to construct and coordinate increas-
ingly sophisticated links between perception and action. The 
development of language introduces words and symbols 
that can be used to focus on different aspects and to classify 
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underlying similarities, to build increasingly sophisticated 
concepts. 
Whereas some commentators are interested in how succes-
sive modes introduce new ways of operation that replace 
earlier modes, the SOLO model explicitly nests each mode 
within the next, so that an increasing repertoire of more 
sophisticated modes of operation become available to the 
learner. At the same time, all modes attained remain avail-
able to be used as appropriate. This is also reflected in the 
enactive-iconic-symbolic modes of Bruner, which are seen 
to develop successively in the child, but then remain simul-
taneously available.  
In a discussion of local theories of conceptual learning, it is 
therefore necessary to take account of the development of 
qualitatively different ways (or modes) of thinking available 
to the individual.  In particular, in later modes, such as the 
formal operational or concrete symbolic mode, the student 
also has available sensori-motor/ikonic modes of thinking to 
offer an alternative perspective.
Local Cycles
Local cycles of conceptual development relate to a specific 
conceptual area in which the learner attempts to make sense 
of the information available and to make connections using 
the overall cognitive structures available to him/her at the 
time. Individual theories have their own interpretations of 
cycles in the learning of specific concepts that clearly relate 
to the concept in question. 
Following Piaget’s distinctions between empirical abstrac-
tion (of properties of perceived objects) and pseudo-empiri-
cal abstraction (of properties of actions on perceived objects), 
Gray & Tall (2001) suggested that there were (at least) three 
different ways of constructing mathematical concepts: from 
a focus on perception of objects and their properties, as oc-
curs in geometry, from actions on objects which are symbol-
ised and the symbols and their properties are built into a op-
erational schema of activities, as in arithmetic and algebra, 
and a later focus on the properties themselves which leads 
to formal axiomatic theories. However, these three different 
ways of concept construction all build from a point where 
the learner observes a moderately complicated situation, 
makes connections, and builds up relationships to produce 
more sophisticated conceptions. This notion of development 
leads to an underlying cycle of knowledge construction. 
This same cycle is formulated in the SOLO model to include 
the observed learning outcomes of individuals responding to 
questions concerning problems in a wide range of contexts. 
The SOLO framework can be considered under the broad 
descriptor of neo-Piagetian models. It evolved as a reaction 
to observed inadequacies in Piaget’s framework where the 
child is observed to operate at different levels on different 
tasks supposedly at the same level, which Piaget termed 
‘décalage’ (Biggs & Collis, 1982). The model shares much 
in common with the ideas of such theorists as Case (1992), 
Fischer (see Fischer & Knight, 1990) and Halford (1993). 
To accommodate the décalage issue, SOLO focuses atten-
tion upon students’ responses rather than their level of think-
ing or stage of development. This represents a critical dis-
tinction between SOLO and the work of Piaget and others 
in that the focus with SOLO is on describing the structure 
of a response not on some cognitive developmental stage 
construct of an individual. A strength of SOLO is that it pro-
vides a framework to enable a consistent interpretation of 
the structure and quality of responses from large numbers 
of students across a variety of learning environments in a 
number of subject and topic areas. 
The ‘local’ framework suggested by SOLO comprises a re-
curring cycle of three levels. In this interpretation, the first 
level of the cycle is referred to as the unistructural (U) level 
of response and focuses on the problem or domain, but uses 
only one piece of relevant data. The multistructural (M) 
level of response is the second level and focuses on two or 
more pieces of data where these data are used without any 
relationships perceived between them; there is no integra-
tion among the different pieces of information. The third 
level, the relational (R) level of response, focuses on all the 
data available, with each piece woven into an overall mosaic 
of relationships to give the whole a coherent structure. 
These three levels, unistructural, multistructural, and rela-
tional, when taken together are referred to as a UMR learn-
ing cycle. They are framed within a wider context with a 
preceding prestructural level of response to a particular 
problem that does not reach even a unistructural level and 
an overall extended abstract level where the qualities of the 
relational level fit within a bigger picture that may become 
the basis of the next cycle of construction.
In the original description of the SOLO Taxonomy, Biggs 
and Collis (1982) noted that the UMR cycle may be seen 
to operate on different levels. For instance they compared 
the cycle with the long-term global framework of Piagetian 
stage theory to suggest that “the levels of prestructural, un-
istructural, multistructural, relational, extended abstract are 
isomorphic to, but logically distinct from, the stages of sen-
sori-motor, pre-operational, early concrete, middle concrete, 
concrete generalization, and formal operational, respective-
ly” (ibid, p. 31). However, they theorized that it was of more 
practical value to consider the UMR sequence occurring in 
each of the successive SOLO modes, so that a UMR cycle 
in one mode could lead to an extended abstract foundation 
for the next mode (ibid, table 10.1, p.216). This provides a 
framework to assign responses to a combination of a given 
level in a given mode.
Subsequently, Pegg (1992) and Pegg and Davey (1998) re-
vealed examples of at least two UMR cycles in the concrete 
symbolic mode, where the relational level response in one 
cycle evolves to a new unistructural level response in the 
next cycle within the same mode. This observation re-focus-
es the theory to smaller cycles of concept formation within 
different modes.
Using this finding, responses in advance of a relational re-
sponse can become a new unistructural level representing 
a first level of a more sophisticated UMR cycle. This new 
cycle may occur as an additional cycle of growth within the 
same mode.  Alternatively, it may represent a new cycle in 
a later acquired mode. These two options are illustrated in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of levels associated 
with the concrete symbolic mode
To unpack this idea further we first need to consider what is 
meant by thinking within the ikonic mode and the concrete 
symbolic mode. The ikonic mode is concerned with ‘sym-
bolising’ the world through oral language. It is associated 
with imaging of objects and the thinking can be described as 
intuitive or relying on perceptually-based judgements. 
For the concrete symbolic mode the ‘concrete’ aspect relates 
to the need for performance in this mode to be rooted in real-
world occurrences. The ‘symbolic’ aspect relates to where a 
person thinks through use and manipulation of symbol sys-
tems such as written language, number systems and written 
music notation. This mode can become available to students 
around about 5-to-6 years of age. The images and words that 
dominated thinking in the ikonic mode now evolve into con-
cepts related to the real world. The symbols (representing 
objects or concepts) can be manipulated according to co-
herent rules without direct recourse to what they represent. 
Hence, immersion in this mode results in the ability to pro-
vide symbolic descriptions of the experienced world that are 
communicable and understandable by others.
As an example of figure 1 in action, let us focus on the de-
velopment of number concepts. In the ikonic mode the child 
is developing verbally, giving names to things and talking 
about what (s)he sees. Numbers in this mode develop from 
the action-schema of counting, to the concept of number, 
independent of how the counting is carried out, to become 
adjectives, such as identifying a set of three elephants, and 
being able to combine this with another set comprising two 
elephants to get five elephants. 
In the concrete symbolic mode, in the case of the concept of 
number, the status of numbers shifts from adjectives to nouns, 
i.e., a symbol in its own right that is available to be commu-
nicated to others, context free and generalisable. A unistruc-
tural level response in the first cycle concerns the ability to 
use one operation to answer simple written problems such as 
2 + 3 without reference to context, by carrying out a suitable 
arithmetic procedure. A multistructural response would in-
volve a couple of operations involving known numbers that 
can be carried out in sequence. The final level in the first cy-
cle culminates in students being able to generate numerous 
responses to the question ‘if 5 is the answer to an addition 
question what are possible questions?’
The second cycle in the concrete symbolic mode for number 
sees the numbers operated upon move beyond those with 
which the student has direct experience. At the unistructural 
level, single operations can be performed on larger num-
bers; many of the operations become automated, reducing 
demand on working memory. The multistructural level re-
sponse concerns students being able to undertake a series of 
computations. Critical here is the need for the task to have a 
sequential basis. 
Finally, the relational level in this second cycle concerns an 
overview of the number system. This is evident in students 
undertaking non-sequential arithmetic tasks successfully 
and being able to offer generalisations based on experienced 
arithmetic patterns. The issue here is that the response is 
tied to the real world and does not include considerations 
of alternative possibilities, conditions or limitations. In the 
SOLO model, these considerations only become apparent 
when the level of response enters the next mode of function-
ing referred to as the formal mode.
The value of acknowledging earlier UMR cycles enables 
a wider range of ‘credit’ to be given to responses of more 
complex questions. For instance, Biggs and Collis (1982) 
posed a question that required students to find the value of 
x in the equation
( ) ( ) ( )72 36 9 72 9 9÷ ÷= × ×x
Responses to this question which show some appreciation 
of arithmetic, without grasping the essential qualities of the 
problem itself can be classified into a first UMR cycle, and 
recorded as U1, M1 and R1 respectively, which simply in-
volve:
U1: responding to a single feature, e.g., “has it got some-
thing to do with the 9s”;
M1: responding to more than one feature, e.g., “It’s got 9s 
and 72s on both sides”;
R1: giving an ‘educated guess’: e.g., “36 – because it needs 
36 on both sides”.
The second UMR cycle (recorded as U2, M2 and R2) 
involves engaging with one or more operations towards 
finding a solution:
U2:  One calculation, e.g. ‘72 ÷ 36= 2’;
M2: observing more than one operation, possibly perform-
ing them with errors;
R2:  seeing patterns and simplifying, e.g., cancelling 9s on 
the right.
Further, responses that have evolved beyond the concrete 
symbolic mode and can be categorised as formal mode re-
sponses are when the student has a clear overview of the 
problem based on the underlying arithmetic patterns, using 
simplifications, only resorting to arithmetic when that be-
comes necessary.
In a curriculum that focuses on making sense at one level 
and building on that sense-making to shift to a higher level, 
the acknowledgement of two or more cycles of response 
suggests more than a successive stratification of each mode 
into several cycles. It suggests the UMR cycle also operates 
in the construction of new concepts as the individual ob-
serves what is initially a new context with disparate aspects 
that are noted individually, then linked together, then seen as 
a new mental concept that can be used in more sophisticated 
thinking. 
This is view of cycles of cognitive development is consist-
ent not only with the epistemological tradition of Piaget and 
with its links with working memory capacity in cognitive 
science, it is also consistent with neurophysiological evi-
dence in which the biological brain builds connections be-
tween neurons. Such connections enables neuronal groups 
to operate in consort, forming a complex mental structure 
conceived as a single sophisticated entity that may in turn 
be an object of reflection to be operated on at a higher level 
(Crick, 1994; Edelman & Tononi, 2000).
Process-Object Encapsulation 
A major instance of concept construction, which occurs 
throughout the development of arithmetic and the manipula-
tion of symbols in algebra, trigonometry, and calculus, is the 
symbolizing of actions as ‘do-able’ procedures and to use 
the symbols to focus on them mentally as ‘think-able’ con-
cepts. This involves a shift in focus from actions on already 
known objects to thinking of those actions as manipulable 
mental objects. 
This cycle of mental construction has been variously de-
scribed as: action, process, object (Dubinsky, 1991); interi-
orization, condensation, reification (Sfard, 1991); or proce-
dure, process, procept—where a procept involves a symbol 
such as 3+2 which can operate dually as process or concept 
(Gray & Tall, 1991, 1994). Each of these theories of ‘proc-
ess-object encapsulation’ is founded essentially on Piaget’s 
notion of ‘reflective abstraction’, in which actions on exist-
ing or known objects become interiorized as processes and 
then encapsulated as mental objects of thought. 
Over the years, successive researchers, such as Dienes 
(1960), Davis (1984), and Greeno (1983) theorized about 
the mechanism by which actions are transformed into men-
tal objects. Dienes used a linguistic analogy, seeing the pred-
icate in one sentence becoming the subject in another. Davis 
saw mathematical procedures growing from sequences of 
actions, termed ‘visually moderated sequences’ (VMS) in 
which each step prompted the next, until familiarity allowed 
it to be conceived as a total process and thought of as a men-
tal entity. Greeno used an information processing approach 
focusing on the manner in which a procedure may become 
the input to another procedure, and hence be conceived as a 
‘conceptual entity’.
Dubinsky described the transformation of action to mental 
objects as part of his APOS theory (Action-Process-Object-
Schema) in which actions are interiorised as processes, then 
thought of as objects within a wider schema (Dubinsky, 
1991). He later asserted that objects could also be formed 
by encapsulation of schemas as well as encapsulation of 
processes (Czarnocha et al., 1999). Sfard (1991) proposed 
an ‘operational’ growth through a cycle she termed interi-
orization-condensation-reification, which produced reified 
objects whose structure gave a complementary ‘structural 
growth’ focusing on the properties of the objects. 
There are differences in detail between the two theories of 
Dubinsky and Sfard. For instance, Sfard’s first stage is re-
ferred to as an ‘interiorized process’, which is the same name 
given in Dubinsky’s second stage. Nevertheless, the broad 
sweep of both theories is similar. They begin with actions 
on known objects (which may be physical or mental) which 
are practised to become routinized step-by-step procedures, 
seen as a whole as processes, then conceived as entities in 
themselves that can be operated on at a higher level to give 
a further cycle of construction.
This analysis can be applied, for example, to the increas-
ing sophistication of an algebraic expression. An expression 
x x2 3−  may be viewed as a command to carry out a se-
quences of actions: start with some number x (say x = 4), 
square it to get x2 (in the particular case, 16), now multi-
ply 3 times x (12) and subtract it from x2 to get the value 
of x x2 3−  (in this case, 16–12, which is 4). We can also 
think of the sequence of actions as a sequential procedure 
to take a particular value of x and compute x x2 3− . An al-
ternative procedure that produces the same result is to cal-
culate x x2 3−  and multiply this x times to give the result 
represented by the expression x x( )− 3 . Now we have two 
different step-by-step procedures that give the same output 
for given input. Are they ‘the same’ or are they ‘different’? 
As procedures, carried out in time, they are certainly dif-
ferent but in terms of the overall process, for a given in-
put, they always give the same output. In this sense they 
are ‘the same’. It is this sameness that we call a ‘process’. 
We can write the process as a function f x x x( ) = −2 3  or as 
f x x x( ) ( )= − 3  and these are just different ways of specify-
ing the same function.
In this case, we can say that the expressions x x2 3−  and 
x x( )− 3  may be conceived at different levels: as procedures 
representing different sequences of evaluation, as processes 
giving rise to the same input-output, as expressions that may 
themselves be manipulated and as functions where they are 
fundamentally the same entity.
Gray and Tall (1994) focused on the increasing sophistica-
tion of the role of symbols, such as 3+4. For some younger 
children it is an instruction to carry out the operation of addi-
tion, more mature thinkers may see it as the concept of sum, 
giving 7. Others may see the symbol as an alternative to 4+3, 
5+2, 1+6, all of which are different ways of seeing the same 
concept 7. Gray and Tall used this increasing compression of 
knowledge, from a procedure carried out in time, to a proc-
ess giving a result and on to different processes giving the 
same result to define the notion of procept. (Technically, an 
elementary procept has a single symbol, say 3+4, which can 
be seen dually as a procedure to be carried out or a concept 
that is produced by it, and a procept consists of a collection 
of elementary procepts, such as 4+3, 5+2, 1+6, which give 
rise to the same output.)
Such cycles of construction occur again and again in the de-
velopment of mathematical thinking, from the compression 
of the action-schema of counting into the concept of number, 
and on through arithmetic of addition, multiplication, pow-
ers, fractions, integers, decimals, through symbol manipula-
tion in arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, calculus and on to 
more advanced mathematical thinking. In each case there is a 
local cycle of concept formation to build the particular math-
ematical concepts. At one level actions are performed on one 
or more known objects, which Gray & Tall (2001) called the 
base object(s) of this cycle, with the operations themselves 
becoming the focus of attention as procedures, condensed 
into overall processes, and conceived as mental objects in 
themselves to become base objects in a further cycle.
Table 3 shows three theoretical frameworks for local cycles 
of construction (Davis, 1984; Dubinsky (Czarnocha et al., 
1999); Gray & Tall, 1994, 2001) laid alongside the SOLO 
UMR sequence for assessing responses at successive levels.
Table 3: Local cycles of cognitive development
SOLO Model Davis Dubinsky APOS Gray & Tall
[Base Objects]
Unistructural 
Multistructural
Procedure 
(VMS) Action Procedure
Relational Integrated Process Process Process
Unistructural 
(in a new cycle) Entity Object Procept
Schema
In each framework, it is possible to apply a SOLO analysis 
to the cycle as a whole. The initial action or procedure is at 
a unistructural level of operation, in which a single proce-
dure is used for a specific problem. The multistructural level 
would suggest the possibility of alternative procedures with-
out them being seen as interconnected, and hence remains at 
an action level in APOS theory; the relational level would 
suggest that different procedures with the same effect are 
now seen as essentially the same process. This leads to the 
encapsulation of process as object (a new unistructural level) 
and its use as an entity in a wider schema of knowledge.
If one so desired, a finer grain SOLO analysis could be ap-
plied to responses to given problems, for instance the ini-
tial action level may involve a number of steps and learners 
may be able to cope initially only with isolated steps, then 
with more than one step, then with the procedure as a whole. 
Once more this gives a preliminary cycle within the larger 
cycle and both have their importance. The first enables the 
learner to interpret symbols as procedures to be carried out 
in time, but the larger cycle enables the symbols themselves 
to become objects of thought that can be manipulated at in-
creasingly sophisticated levels of thought.
Similar Cycles in Different Modes
Now we move on to the idea that different modes are avail-
able to individuals as they grow more sophisticated, so that 
not only can students in, say, the concrete symbolic mode 
operate within this mode, they also have available knowl-
edge structures in earlier modes, such as sensori-motor or 
ikonic. The question arises therefore how does knowledge 
in these earlier modes relate to the more sophisticated modes 
of operation. For example, in what way might the develop-
ment of conceptions in the symbolic mode be supported by 
physical action and perception in more sophisticated aspects 
of the sensori-motor and ikonic modes of operation?
In the case of the concept of vector, Poynter (2004) began 
by considering the physical transformation of an object on a 
flat surface while encouraging students to switch their focus 
of attention from the specific actions they performed to the 
effect of those actions. The action could be quite compli-
cated: push the object from position A to position B and then 
to position C. The action is quite different from the direct 
translation from position A to position C, however, the ef-
fect of both actions are the same: they all start at A, end at 
C, without being concerned about what happens in between. 
The perception of actions as being different may be consid-
ered a multistructural response, while the focus on the same 
effect shifts to a relational perspective.
The effect of the translation can be represented by an arrow 
from any start point on the object to the same point on the 
translated object; all such arrows have the same magnitude 
and direction. This can be represented as a single arrow that 
may be shifted around, as long as it maintains the same mag-
nitude and direction. This moveable arrow gives a new em-
bodiment of the effect of the translation as a free vector. It is 
now an entity that can be operated on at a higher level. The 
sum of two free vectors is simply the single free vector that 
has the same effect as the two combined, one after the other. 
The movable free vector is an enactive-ikonic entity that en-
capsulates the process of translation as a mental object that 
can itself be operated upon.
In this example, the shifting of the arrow is both a physical 
action (sensori-motor) and also an ikonic representation (as 
an arrow described as a free vector). Taking the hint from 
the view of the SOLO model, that each mode remained part 
of a later mode, Tall (2004) put together sensori-motor and 
ikonic aspects—or, in Brunerian terms, a combination of en-
active and ikonic—into one single corporate mode of opera-
tion which he named ‘conceptual-embodied’ (to distinguish 
it from Lakoff’s broader use of the term ‘embodied’) but 
shortened to ‘embodied’ mode where there was no possibil-
ity of confusion. Embodiment is a combination of action and 
perception and, over the years, it becomes more sophisti-
cated through the use of language. 
The embodied mode of operation is complemented by the 
use of symbols in arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, calcu-
lus, and so on, which have a proceptual structure. Tall (2004) 
calls this mode of operation ‘symbolic-proceptual’ or ‘sym-
bolic’ for short. Studying these complementary modes of 
operation, he found that they offer two quite different worlds 
of mathematics, one based on physical action and percep-
tion becoming more conceptual through reflection, the other 
becoming more sophisticated and powerful through the en-
capsulation of processes as mental objects that could be ma-
nipulated as symbols. 
He saw a third ‘formal-axiomatic’ world of mental opera-
tions where the properties were described using set-theory 
and became part of a formal system of definitions and for-
mal proof. Here whole schemas, such as the arithmetic of 
decimal numbers, or the manipulation of vectors in space, 
were generalised and encapsulated as single entities defined 
axiomatically as ‘a complete ordered field’ or ‘a vector space 
over a field of scalars’.
This framework has a similar origin to that of the SOLO 
model, but is different in detail, for whereas SOLO looks 
at the processing of information in successive modes of de-
velopment and analyses the observed structure of responses, 
the three worlds of mathematics offers a framework for cog-
nitive development from the action and perception of the 
child through many mental constructions in embodiment 
and symbolism to the higher levels of formal axiomatic 
mathematics. Over the years, Tall and Gray and their doc-
toral students have mapped out some of the ways in which 
compression of knowledge from process to mental object 
occur in arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, calculus, and on 
to formal mathematics, not only observing the overall proc-
ess of compression in each context, but the way in which the 
different contexts bring different conceptual challenges that 
face the learner (Gray, Pitta, Pinto, & Tall, 1999; Tall, Gray, 
Ali, Crowley, DeMarois, McGowen, Pitta, Pinto, Thomas, 
Yusof, 2000).
In the school context, just as the target SOLO mode is the 
concrete symbolic mode, with sensori-motor and ikonic 
support, this framework categorises modes of operation into 
just two complementary worlds of mathematics: the embod-
ied and the symbolic.
The question arises: can this formulation offer ways of con-
ceptualising parallel local cycles of construction in math-
ematics? The example of vector shows one case in which the 
shift in focus of attention from action to effect can be em-
bodied to give the notion of free vector as representative of 
the action. Later, focus on the properties involved can lead 
to the selected properties for operations on vectors being 
used as a formal basis for the definition of a vector space.
This enables us to consider the action-effect-embodiment 
cycle in the embodied world to be mirrored by an action-
process-procept cycle in the symbolic world. This link be-
tween compression from ‘do-able’ action to thinkable con-
cept in the embodied and symbolic worlds arises naturally in 
other formations of symbolic concepts in mathematics.
In the case of fractions, for example, the action of dividing 
an object or a set of objects into an equal number of parts 
and selecting a certain number of them (for instance, take a 
quantity and divide into 6 equal parts and select three, or di-
vide it into 4 equal parts and select two) can lead to different 
actions having the same effect. In this case three sixths and 
two fourths have the same effect in terms of quantity (though 
not, of course, in terms of the number of pieces produced). 
The subtle shift from the action of sharing to the effect of 
that sharing leads to the fractions 36  and 2 4  representing 
the same effect. This parallels the equivalence of fractions 
in the symbolic world and is an example of the concept of 
equivalence relation, initially in the form of manipulation 
of symbols in the symbolic world and later in terms of the 
set-theoretic definition of equivalence relation in the formal-
axiomatic world of mathematical thinking.
In this way we see corresponding cycles giving increasingly 
sophisticated conceptions in successive modes of cognitive 
growth. Although there are individual differences in various 
theories of concept construction through reflective abstrac-
tion on actions, this fundamental cycle of concept construc-
tion from ‘do-able’ action to ‘think-able’ concept underlies 
them all.
Table 4: The fundamental cycle of conceptual construction 
from action to object
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Discussion
This paper has considered several different theoretical 
frameworks at both a global and local level, and has focused 
on an underlying cycle of conceptual development from ac-
tions in time to concepts that can be manipulated as mental 
entities. This cycle occurs not only in different mathematical 
concepts, but in different modes of operation in long-term 
cognitive growth. At the heart of the process is the switching 
focus of attention from the specific sequence of steps in an 
action to the corresponding symbolism that not only evokes 
the process to be carried out but also represents the concept 
that is constructed.
It is not claimed that this is the only way in which concepts 
grow. It was earlier noted that there are different ways in 
which concepts can be constructed, including constructions 
from perceptions of objects, actions on objects and proper-
ties of objects. The first construction leads to a van Hiele 
type development in which objects are recognized, and vari-
ous properties discerned and described.  This knowing is 
then used to formulate definitions that are in turn used in 
Euclidean proof. The second construction uses symbols to 
represent the actions that become mental objects that can 
be manipulated at successively sophisticated levels. The 
third construction leads to the creation of axiomatic struc-
tures through formal definition and proof, in which a whole 
schema, such as the arithmetic of decimals can be recon-
structed as a mental object, in this case, a complete ordered 
field. Significantly, all of these can be categorised so that the 
learning outcomes can be analysed in terms of the SOLO 
UMR cycle.
In this paper we have focused more specifically on the sec-
ond case in which concepts are constructed by compressing 
action-schemas into manipulable concepts by using symbols. 
This is the major cycle of concept construction in arithmetic, 
algebra, symbolic calculus, and other contexts where proce-
dures are symbolised and the symbols themselves become 
objects of thought. It includes the action-schema of count-
ing and the concept of number, the operation of sharing and 
the concept of fraction, general arithmetic operations as 
templates for manipulable algebraic expressions, ratios in 
trigonometry that become trigonometric functions, rates of 
change that become derivatives, and so on. 
In all of these ‘topics’ there is an underlying local cycle of 
concept construction from action-schema to mental object. 
All these operations can be carried out as embodied activi-
ties, either as physical operations or thought experiments, 
and may then be symbolised to give greater flexibility of cal-
culation and manipulation. The local cycle of construction 
in the embodied world occurs through a shift of attention 
from the doing of the action to an embodiment of the effect 
of the action. This supports the parallel symbolic activity in 
which an action is symbolized as a procedure to be carried 
out, and then the symbols take on a new meaning as mental 
objects that can be manipulated in higher-level calculations 
and symbolic manipulations.
In addition, all of these topics share an underlying local cy-
cle of construction that begins with a situation that presents 
complications to the learner, who may focus at first on single 
aspects, but then sees other aspects and makes links between 
them to build not just a more complex conception, but also 
a richer compressed conception that can be operated as a 
single entity at a higher level. Such a development is de-
scribed in the SOLO model to analyse the observed learning 
outcomes, but also features as a local cycle of learning in a 
wide range of local theoretical frameworks. In the case of 
compression of knowledge from doing mathematics by per-
forming actions, to symbolising those actions as thinkable 
concepts, all these theoretical frameworks share the same 
underlying local cycle of learning.
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